

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUPPLEMENT TO
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1. The SPD leadership held a policy conference of the combined executive council and executive committee, including virtually all the members of the SPD hierarchy, over the weekend 30 March to 1 April 1951. Under the chairmanship of Erich Ollenhauer, deputy chairman of the party, the meeting officially disavowed the recent pro-Schuman Plan statement of Wilhelm Kaisen, Bremen, and listened to a vitriolic speech by Dr. Kurt Schumacher in which the Western allies were bitterly criticized.
2. On the occasion of a recent trip to Paris, Brauen Senate President, Wilhelm Kaisen, had deviated from the party line by approving the Schuman Plan. The executive council and the enlarged executive committee unanimously endorsed the resolution censuring Kaisen's utterances.*
3. The major part of the meeting was taken up by a keynote address by Schumacher concerning the Saar question, U. S. and French policies, and co-determination. The statement on the Saar question was occasioned by a report of Fritz Heine concerning a meeting which he had had with representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Saar (SPS) in answer to their request for closer co-operation between the two organizations.** He reported that on 21 March 1951, he and two other members of the SPD executive committee, Willy Achler and Franz Boegler, had met with Richard Rauch and Carl Etienne of the SPS in Kaiserslautern. They discussed the tactics to be employed by the pro-SPD - pro-German faction within the SPS against the dominance of the pro-French leaders. Schumacher's representatives had aided the dissident SPS men in preparation of a resolution to be presented at the coming Saar party convention. The resolution would require the following action:
 - a. The SPS shall declare itself a regional organization of the SPD.
 - b. The two SPS ministers in the Saar cabinet, Heinz Braun, Justice, and Richard Kirm, Labor and Welfare, shall resign their positions in protest against the neglect of German interests by the administration of Minister President Johann Hoffmann (CVP-CDU).

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- c. The government of France is requested to return the Saar to the jurisdiction of the Federal government of Germany, retaining only certain economic rights contractually specified.
- d. The SPS shall press for a plebiscite on the Saar question.
4. Heine reported that the Saar representatives at the Kaiserslautern meeting had been of the opinion that if properly managed such a resolution would find the overwhelming support of the convention delegates. However, according to the by-laws of the SPS, all resolutions have to be approved by the executive committee before they can be presented to the plenum. Since the resolution militates against the vested interests of some powerful members of the SPS executive committee, it was felt, that it might never reach the floor. After hearing Heine, the SPD leadership decided to force the hand of the SPS, if necessary, by distributing the resolution in leaflet form at the convention and throughout the Saar.
5. Speaking on the Saar question in general, after hearing the Heine report, Schumacher lashed out against U. S. policies. The present-day hegemony of France in the Saar, he stated, is the direct result of American indifference. This indifference of the U. S. government in the Saar question, the very fact that the present conditions are tolerated, has undermined the morale and the support of those who would like to make an issue of the Oder-Neisse line. The Americans could gain the admiration and support of untold millions of German citizens if they would courageously demand a plebiscite on the Saar question as a matter of principle and international law. Such a step would not only give tremendous support to the propaganda against the Oder-Neisse line, in western Germany, but it would also demonstrate the right of self-determination and Western adherence to international law to all the Germans now living under Soviet domination.
6. Expanding upon French-German relations, Schumacher attacked the German policies of the French government and those of the French High Commissioner, Andre Francois-Poncet. It is Schumacher's opinion that the French Foreign Office, which guides the French High Commission's policies is still dominated by a pro-clerical clique which hopes for a return of de Gaulle. They work toward the day when they can eliminate American influence on the continent through a French-Italian Catholic alliance. To prepare the German political scene for that eventuality, French policy has encouraged the Catholic factions in Southwest Germany to gerrymander in Wurttemberg and Baden. Schumacher said he cannot understand how the Americans can be so unintelligent as to fail to recognize the French duplicity. He believes that it has been official U. S. policy to liquidate the small states, which were forced upon Germany by the French after 1945, but that some American officials, at the lower level of administration, continue to aid the French in maintaining this economically untenable splinter states. Schumacher accused Francois-Poncet of having meddled in intra-German and intra-party affairs by attempting to turn some south German SPD officials against establishment of the Southwest state. In the future, he stated, the US will resist all such attempts by the French High Commissioner and if the French representatives in Germany do not cease and desist from their efforts, and reprimand those officials who interfere in purely German matters, the SPD will be forced to expose them via the press. And if the Americans cannot see what is going on, then the SPD will have no choice but to attack them also.
7. Speaking on renmilitarization, Schumacher stated that his policy had not changed. All the conferences and meetings with the German military experts and Allied officials had demonstrated only too clearly that not one of the SPD's prerequisites for a German contribution to the defense effort had been met. He then related that a Federal Minister had recently approached him to ascertain whether the SPD might be induced to make some joint preparations for guerrilla warfare under U. S. auspices. Schumacher told him that he considered all that guerrilla warfare chatter preposterous. That sort of thing would have to be left to professional adventurers. A serious political party could not defile itself by seriously discussing the matter. Furthermore, Schumacher said, he did not believe that the suggestion came from an official U. S. agency. He ventured that it probably originated with some irresponsible elements in charge of confidential funds. He did

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not doubt, however, that "such people" would attempt to recruit some agents among the lower strata of German government officials and in the various parties. With that statement, according to source, Schumacher referred to the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity. The SPD leadership, he said, would probably be forced to expose the machinations of this thinly veiled espionage agency and its rackets in the near future. If some American circles believe, he said, that they can buy themselves allies by founding a multitude of clubs they have another guess coming. One cannot make a political alliance with a bunch of agents and racketeers. The same, he said, goes for the UAW, which he alleged to be financed in part by Tito and in part by U. S. funds.

3. Speaking of the Schuman Plan, Schumacher became very bitter on what he called American stupidity: We know very well, he said, that the Americans do not take this French Schuman Plan "toy" seriously. They only agreed to it because they want to allow the seriously threatened French government some semblance of "European success". In his opinion, the Americans apparently do not realize how they have damaged the morale of the German workers with what he called a cheap trick. He believes the effect to have been so demoralizing that it might lead one to the suspicion that the responsible American officials were deliberately aiding Soviet propaganda. Schumacher seemed almost desperate over the lack of political finesse among U. S. officials. Instead of giving the German workers the moral encouragement necessary to resist Communistic propaganda, the Americans have deprived them of it. Just imagine the reverse, he said, suppose the Americans and French had said, "You German workers have helped admirably in the reconstruction of your industries after the collapse of the Nazi regime. We trust you. Therefore, we give you equal rights with the owners in determining the economic policies of your enterprises". There would have been a wave of enthusiasm for Western democracy among the German workers, Schumacher said, an enthusiasm so great that it would have eliminated the last shred of success of Communistic propaganda. But instead the Americans have intervened with the trade union leaders to endorse the Schuman Plan and to compromise on co-determination; thus they have attempted to deliver the German workers into the hands of international managers who are beyond the control of the democratic process. If the SPD had no other reason to fight the Schuman Plan, he stated, that alone would suffice. If the Western democracies are too stupid, Schumacher continued, to know how to turn the German workers into anti-Communists, then the SPD will have to undertake that task alone. It does so not only in the interest of Germany, but of Europe, of the whole world.
9. Schumacher then wondered whether the Americans had not yet realized that one could not count on the help of vested interests and the bourgeoisie in Germany or in France in the fight against Communism. The vested interests in both countries, he said, are so devoid of all intelligence that ever since 1945 they have practically driven the workers to espouse Communism. In his opinion, the ECA funds, contributed by the American taxpayer, had in both countries been wasted in a manner bordering on fraud. Not one of the German postwar social problems had been solved. Yet there were more millionaires in Germany today than during the Weimar Republic. He accused the government of muddling through from stupidity to stupidity and called the talk of German rearmament the climax of handing propaganda material to the Russians. In closing, Schumacher wondered, not without bitterness, whether the Americans with whom he discussed these problems from time to time lacked the ability to comprehend the problems or the power to present them properly in Washington. Schumacher said: Sometimes the dilettantism of the people with whom he has to discuss these problems hurts him more than his amputated leg.

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* Schumacher had previously threatened to disavow publicly any statements made by SPD leaders while on international tours, if they deviated from the official party policy. Some circles had feared a schism over that issue. The fact that Schumacher's reprimand of Kaisen received the unanimous approval of the executive committee and was accepted without discussion by the executive council indicates that Schumacher's leadership of his party is still undisputed and that Kaisen misjudged the situation in his obvious belief that he could muster some support from other SPD leaders.

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